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The contribution of feminist research to the rise of qualitative methods: 
Soft data instead of hard facts. 
 
Vivien Burr 




Psychology as a science 
When I was a psychology undergraduate in the early 1970s, one of the first 
things I learned was that psychology is a science. Like the natural sciences 
such as biology and chemistry, psychology was about designing experiments 
where variables were carefully controlled and measuring their effects. The 
experiment should be designed so as to control any social or environmental 
factors that might prevent the researcher from revealing the nature of a 
psychological phenomenon in its pure form. 
 
Of course, because the subject matter of the psychology is human beings, 
they are not just like the things studies by the natural sciences- human beings 
think about what is happening to them in a psychology experiment and have 
an unfortunate tendency to treat the researcher just like another human being. 
So the researcher must try to eliminate any biases arising from their own 
personality, background and status. In effect, the researcher must try to exist 
for their subjects as little as possible- they must try to be nothing more than a 
data recording machine. Any interaction with their subjects must be kept to a 
minimum and must be standardised across all subjects. 
 
Most psychological research that I learned about as an undergraduate was 
quantitative; but qualitative methods, like interviews, were sometimes used 
and in fact I later used a structured interview for part of my own PhD research.  
However, the accepted wisdom at the time was that, when using such tools, 
the researcher should aim to make them as comparable to quantitative 
methods as possible; each subject should be interviewed in the same way, 
using exactly the same questions presented in an identical manner. 
 
All this seemed perfectly reasonable and I was unaware that there were 
contradictory voices trying to be heard. 
 
 
The crisis in social psychology  
It seems quite bizarre to me now that, during the 1960s and 1970s- that is, 
around the time when I was studying for my degree, ideas were emerging, 
particularly in social psychology, that raised serious concerns about our 
values and methods. This was the first wave of what came to be known as 
‘the crisis in social psychology’. Eminent academics such as Rom Harré and 
Henri Tajfel contributed to this, but it passed apparently unnoticed in my 
psychology department. 
 
Critics argued that psychology’s research agenda had yielded little that was 
useful or insightful.  There was concern that the experimental method might 
be technically sophisticated but offered little understanding of social 
phenomena- the artificial world of the laboratory could not capture the 
complexity of human social experience and the important contextual features 
that give behaviour its meaning.  Questions were raised about the ethics of 
deception and the nature of the relationship between experimenter and 
subject. 
 
However, as I say this all passed me by; why were these issues not 
addressed as part of the psychology curriculum? Who decides what is on the 
curriculum and has anything changed today? In the UK the professional body 
for psychologists, the British Psychological Society (BPS) has the power to 
control the content of undergraduate psychology degrees. The curriculum is 
very similar to what I studied nearly 40 years ago and what we today refer to 
as ‘critical psychology’ is not part of it. 
 
The feminist critique  
It was only when I began teaching at Huddersfield in the early 1980s that I 
began to be aware of some of these critical voices, particularly those of 
feminists who were trying, with some difficulty, to be psychologists. It 
seemed that the practice of psychology and even its fundamental agenda 
may be incompatible with feminist ideas. Over the next fifteen years or so, 
feminist psychologists in the UK such as Sue Wilkinson, Celia Kitzinger, 
Erica Burman, Corrine Squire and Jane Ussher raised a number of 
concerns about how women and men are located within psychology, both 
as researchers and as the subjects of research. 
 
Androcentrism 
A key criticism was that psychology is androcentric, that psychology, and 
especially its claims to status as a ‘science’, are based on a fundamentally 
masculine vision of the world, derived from men and male experience; 
mainstream psychology has been referred to by feminists as ‘malestream’. 
 
For example, in Lawrence Kohlberg’s classic research on moral 
development in the late 1950s, Kohlberg developed his theory of moral 
reasoning using only boys and young men as subjects. Critics, for 
example Carol Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982), argued that the theory inevitably 
reflects a male viewpoint and that when girls and women were later 
studied within this theory their behaviour and experience became 
distorted.  
 
Such practices construct male experience as normal or standard, so that 
women become easily seen as deviant or pathological. And this problem 
reaches beyond gender, for example when psychologists study working 
class people or ethnic groups using tests or theories that have been 
derived from white, middle class male subjects. So it is important to 
recognise that the concerns of feminist psychologists apply well beyond 
the boundaries of gender. 
 
A second criticism from feminists concerned the research problems that are 
considered worthy of attention by psychologists. They argued that the 
phenomena that psychology has focussed upon have been those that have 
seemed important to men and the male-dominated discipline as well as the 
governments and industrialists funding the research, for example leadership, 
decision-making and problem-solving. But issues that are of direct concern to 
women were marginalised. 
 
Jane Ussher (1989) tells how her research on menstruation and 
premenstrual syndrome was not seen as ‘real psychology’ by her male 
colleagues. She points out that issues like menstruation, pregnancy and 
childbirth, although of obvious significance to women, were ignored in 
lifespan research. This marginalisation also operates through editorial 
decisions to publish or not to publish such work in respected psychology 
journals and through the decisions of funding bodies.  
 
There has been a growing concern by feminist psychologists to make the 
study of women’s experience legitimate for psychologists. The BPS now 
has a Psychology of Women Section and even a Psychology of 
Lesbianism Section. There has been a steady rise in publications which 
explicitly aim to study women’s experience in its own right and to avoid 
pathologising it by comparing it to a male ‘standard’.  
 
But some feminists argue that psychology is even more fundamentally 
gendered, and that its very foundations as a science are part of an 
ultimately male experience and vision of the world. 
 
Value-freedom and objectivity 
Psychology has built its reputation on imitating the natural sciences and 
key to this are the concepts of value-freedom and objectivity, the concern 
that our research is free from prior assumptions, vested interests and 
subjective interpretations. But some feminists argue not only that vested 
interests are pervasive in psychology but also that the goals of objectivity 
and value-freedom themselves are unattainable, masculine fantasies. 
 
Where funding is concerned, it seems obvious that we should at least be 
cautious about assuming that research findings are value-free and 
objective; many researchers are very aware of the difficulties in delivering 
‘unpopular’ research findings to industry or government funding bodies. 
But in addition deep-rooted societal assumptions and values inevitably 
creep into our research questions and interpretations of research findings: 
 
It is argued that the whole ‘sex differences’ research agenda of the mid to 
late 20th century was heavily influenced by entrenched patriarchal 
assumptions, based on the assumption that men and women are different 
kinds of people. While psychology claims to be apolitical because it is 
objective and value-free, this claim is itself seen as very political since it 
obscures the role that psychology has played and continues to play in 
supporting social inequalities that are not limited to gender. We may for 
example also point out the inequalities endorsed by earlier psychological 
research that supported the idea of racial differences in intelligence. 
 
But feminists make a more general point about value-freedom and 
objectivity. Science, including Psychology, gives the impression that there 
are ‘facts’ about the nature of the world which are waiting to be discovered 
through our scientific methods and that there are self-evident social 
problems that need to be researched. But there is really no such thing as a 
self-evident problem. A problem is always a problem for someone; and 
one person’s ‘problem’ may be another’s ‘solution’. For example, in the UK 
we often hear that the breakdown of the family is a problem. Governments 
complain about the rise in divorce rates and single parent families. These 
certainly are problems for the state; they have implications for the 
provision of welfare and housing, as well as for the role of the family in the 
care of the elderly. However, what has been called women’s ‘flight from 
the family’ may be, for some women, a solution to the problems of 
oppressive marriages or abusive partners, and these things may not be 
experienced as problems by their partners. When this becomes defined as 
a problem, we must ask for whom this appears as a problem and whether 
some people have a greater power than others to decide just what 
constitutes a problem anyway.  
 
The kinds of answers we can get to our research questions are 
necessarily limited by the problems that seem self-evident to us, from our 
perspective as governments, men, women or any other grouping. And 
‘objectivity’ becomes a fiction. Facts are always the product of someone 
choosing to ask a particular question which in its turn rests on prior 
assumptions for instance, that ‘the family’ should be preserved, or that 
men and women must be different from one another.  So we cannot claim 
that research findings are truly objective; it is a logical impossibility, since 
no-one is able to see the world from anything other than their own position 
in it.  
 
In addition, research findings must be interpreted and are inevitably 
framed by the knowledge and assumptions of the researcher, who 
ultimately is just an ordinary human being, like everyone else. It is a 
fantasy to expect that we can step outside of our culture’s taken-for-
granted assumptions and stereotypes by an act of will or by calling 
ourselves scientists.  For example, findings that men are ‘field 
independent’ (which is positively valued) and women field dependent 
(seen as a handicap) might just as legitimately have been interpreted as 
showing that women are able to take contextual features into 
consideration and men tend to take things out of context. But they were 
not.  
 
The researcher-subject relationship 
The relationship between researcher and subjects is profoundly 
undemocratic. The researcher is seen as the bearer of knowledge, the one 
who tests theories and whose interpretation of the say results carries 
weight. The subject, by contrast, merely responds to stimuli and is not 
consulted about the interpretation of their behaviour. Because the 
experimental subject’s behaviour and experience is stripped of the social 
context which gives their behaviour its meaning, it has been argued that 
psychology has not done justice to the perspective and agency of the 
people it has used in its research, irrespective of their gender, class or 
ethnicity. Psychology has taken the experience of such people and has 
offered accounts of it which those people have had no voice in producing 
and which may served to reinforce the inequalities they already suffer.  
 
But this concern to detach the person from their social world and to 
construct the fantasy of the separate, self-contained individual that is 
psychology’s subject-matter, is seen by some feminists as a particularly 
masculine preoccupation; here, a fear and distrust of relationships with 
others is argued to be a masculine concern, based on anxieties about 
autonomy and independence. The experimental paradigm in psychology 
thus becomes seen as associated with the insecurities and vested 
interests of masculinity. So why should we see this paradigm as superior? 
 
Re-writing the aims of psychological research 
The arguments against the experiment as an appropriate research design 
for psychology are now well-documented, although they have had little 
impact in the traditional paradigm still enjoys a privileged position. 
However, there has been a growing move among feminist psychologists 
(and others) to question the dominant definition of science and to promote 
methods which are based upon very different assumptions about the aims 
and purposes of research.  
 
The central concern is for a more democratic vision of research, where the 
aim is no longer for ‘scientists’ to perform experiments on ‘ordinary people’ 
but to conduct research which is explicitly for people. Feminists have tried 
to redress the balance by conducting research which generates 
explanations that women themselves can own, understand and use to 
change their lives, not explanations useful to ‘male’ institutions such as 
medicine and the law. This model demands that the views and 
interpretations of the people being researched have at least as much 
validity than those of the researcher, and has led to a preference for the 
term ‘participant’ rather than ‘subject’.  
 
So there has been a growing enthusiasm for methods of enquiry which do 
allow the ‘voice’ of the participant a place, giving validity to the person’s 
experience and their account of it. Qualitative research methods, which 
have been widely used in other social sciences, such as sociology and 
anthropology, are now becoming more respectable in psychology. 
Nevertheless, there is still a widespread perception that quantitative (or 
‘hard’) data is somehow superior to qualitative (often referred to as ‘soft’) 
data. The words ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ themselves are so infused  with gender 
connotations that it is difficult not to agree that the quantitative/qualitative 
debate or divide is one that fundamentally maps on to gender divisions. 
 
Depth interviewing has become a popular method with researchers who 
aim for the democtratisation of research. But textbook advice on how to 
conduct rigourous and valid interviews is often based upon the same idea 
of dispassionate objectivity that underpins the experimental method. 
Interviewers are supposed to operate only as recorders of information, and 
to minimise their own impact upon the respondents in order not to ‘bias’ 
their responses. They are advised not to become too friendly with their 
interviewees or to talk about themselves.  
 
The sociologist Anne Oakley, who has inspired feminist-minded 
psychologists, sees these recommendations as originating in the same 
masculine preoccupation with objectivity and detachment that underpins 
experimental method, and argues that successful interviewing cannot 
realistically achieve these ends and indeed should not try to do so.  
Oakley discussed her research, in which she interviewed women about 
their experiences of childbirth. She argued that the process of conducting 
an interview is in practice very different from the recommended model 
(1981). It is a fantasy that the interviewer can be an impersonal stimulus 
which evokes an uncontaminated or pure response from the interviewee. 
In reality, interviewer and interviewee are bound up in a social relationship, 
and the contributions to the interview data of each person cannot be 
separated.  
 
But this does not mean the interview is biased or invalid; it means that all 
scientific inquiry involving people is necessarily embedded in a web of 
social relations from which it simply cannot be separated. Laboratory 
experiments are no exception to this, and should be seen not as revealing 
examples of pure and unbiased behaviour, but as social interactions 
themselves- albeit of a peculiar and particular kind, with their own sets of 
expectations and rules. 
 
Reflexivity 
This view leads to the recommendation that as researchers we accept and 
work with this interconnectedness between researcher and participant. 
Breaking the rules of interviewing (for example allowing the researcher to 
offer their own experience or to answer personal questions) is thus seen 
as producing a more rather than less valid interview. The role of the 
researcher is made explicit in a discussion of the research, which 
comments upon its own method of production, producing an account 
which is much more reflexive than would be possible within the traditional 
paradigm. 
 
For example, a friend of mine was studying the relationship between 
adopted daughters and their adoptive mothers. As an adopted daughter 
herself, she argues that to properly research these relationships it would 
not be possible or desirable for her to try to distance herself from her 
respondents, and openly discusses the way her own biography has 
contributed to the research. 
 
Conclusion 
Feminist thinkers have contributed to the rise in the use of qualitative 
methods in psychology by arguing for a different conception of what it 
means to do science, one that accepts the relativity of different 
perspectives, that acknowledges that research findings are a co-
production between researcher and participants, that argues for a 
transparent discussion of the values underpinning our research, that aims 
to be liberatory and facilitative for its participants,  and tries to avoid 
unequal power relationships in the research process. 
 
However, there is still a deep suspicion and de-valuing of qualitative 
methods in some parts of the discipline. The labelling of qualitative data as 
‘soft’ as opposed to the ‘hard facts’ supposedly revealed by more 
traditional methods, seems to me to signal that in challenging 
methodological assumptions and traditions in psychology we are 
challenging something much more fundamental to society-  the divisions 
and inequalities attached to the gender categories of masculine and 
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